In Chile, Peru, and Colombia, U.S. officials are training local forces in threat detection, although the equipment comes directly from the Pentagon or the CIA. Espionage no longer requires hidden microphones or agents in hats. Every Latin American government believes it is protecting its digital sovereignty, but the reality is that all depend on technologies designed outside the continent. In Latin America, the countries with the greatest intelligence capabilities remain Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, although none can compete with the sophistication of Israeli or Iranian services, which operate in the region with complete discretion. Once installed, this software collects information from millions of citizens and transmits it to servers located outside the country. The paradox is that while the great powers compete, Latin American governments do not cooperate with each other. It was a humiliation for Argentine intelligence and a demonstration of the lack of regional coordination. The enemy no longer infiltrates borders but infiltrates algorithms. Intelligence agencies must prioritize intellect over filling their ranks with retired police and military. Private companies offering “predictive analysis” or “cybersecurity” act as information intermediaries for governments and corporations. Chile, with its strategic geographical position and institutional stability, has become an ideal platform for testing monitoring technologies. The presence of foreign agents in local security operations is known but rarely officially acknowledged. Argentina is the most eloquent case: the Iranian Vice President, accused of the AMIA bombing, was in Buenos Aires and the south of the country on an official visit without local services detecting his entry. In matters of espionage, improvisation still defeats strategy. Chile, like other countries, lacks good intelligence services. In practice, they are espionage routes that allow powers to listen, map, and predict economic and political movements. A former official of the National Security Agency (NSA) recently stated that “the new gold of Latin America is not the minerals, but its databases.” The dispute occurs in the shadows, in telecommunications systems, in submarine cables, and in technology companies that expand under the discourse of “digital connectivity.” For decades, espionage in Latin America was an affair of embassies and informants recruited from among military and diplomats. That is, the government changes and the agents change. Some countries are pressured to accept intelligence software under the pretext of fighting drug trafficking or irregular migration. Their officials are political appointees, not career professionals. Whoever controls the information will control political decisions, markets, and public opinion. The priority is not security, but getting rich from equipment purchases, as they know their positions will last only a few years. The region seems not to have learned that espionage never retires, it only changes its face. Latin America is facing a new form of intervention: an invisible invasion that does not require soldiers, but engineers. Latin America is still behind in technology and the preparation of its officials, who see the intelligence office as a 9-to-5 job or are simply demotivated to see their bosses involved in corruption. Interference Now it infiltrates mobile applications, surveillance cameras, and cloud storage services. The line between civilian and military blurs in data centers and artificial intelligence laboratories. Russia and China, in turn, have perfected the strategy of “silent influence”: offering donations, scholarships, or infrastructure projects in exchange for privileged access to national networks. No one publicly discusses who controls the servers, or which governments access the information. In appearance, they are civilian works. And intelligence agencies know it. In some countries, officials and academics are unaware that exchange programs include information collection protocols. The United States, perceiving this advance, has reactivated its presence with another language. It has no training or fewer academies to train its agents. It is the digital Cold War. In the last decade, at least five submarine communication cables were financed by consortia linked to China or the U.S. Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are competing for data, not for territories. The Chilean case illustrates the transformation well. What began as environmental monitoring or border control ended in facial recognition experiments in airports and legal interception systems managed by foreign contractors. Meanwhile, in Argentina and Brazil, agreements for “technological” cooperation with companies that actually have ties to intelligence agencies in their countries of origin are multiplying. While Chile signs cybersecurity agreements with the United States, at the same time, Chinese companies are installing fiber optic infrastructure connecting the South Pacific with Asia. Each country negotiates its technology agreements individually, repeating the mistakes of the past: delivering sovereignty in exchange for investment or military assistance. In the coming years, the battle for data will be as important as that for lithium or oil. But this time, it is not about visible military bases or sponsored coups. One must learn from the best. Today, however, foreign intelligence is camouflaged among startups, consultancies, universities, and foundations. The Latin American region has become the new board for global competition between powers. It is no longer a matter of “intervention,” but of “protecting the hemisphere's cyberspace.” Israel, Iran, the United States, Cuba, Russia, and China.
